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Abstract
We investigate two paradigms for studying the evolution of cooperation—Prisoner’s
Dilemma and Snowdrift game in an online friendship network obtained from a social
networking site. We demonstrate that such social network has small-world property
and degree distribution has a power-law tail. Besides, it has hierarchical organiza-
tions and exhibits disassortative mixing pattern. We study the evolutionary version
of the two types of games on it. It is found that enhancement and sustainment of
cooperative behaviors are attributable to the underlying network topological orga-
nization. It is also shown that cooperators can survive when confronted with the
invasion of defectors throughout the entire ranges of parameters of both games. The
evolution of cooperation on empirical networks is influenced by various network ef-
fects in a combined manner, compared with that on model networks. Our results
can help understand the cooperative behaviors in human groups and society.
Key words: Social networks, Prisoner’s Dilemma, Snowdrift game, Cooperation,
Network effects
PACS: 89.75.Hc, 87.23.Ge, 02.50.Le.
1 Introduction
Cooperative behaviors (mutualism and altruism) are ubiquitous in human so-
ciety as well as in virtual online community. For instance, people unselfishly
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and collaboratively recommend commodities such as books, songs, CD/DVDs,
etc to each other. Accordingly, this cooperative behavior (collaborative recom-
mendation) promotes the long tail which is the success foundation of Amazon
and eBay [1]. And yet, according to Darwinism, natural selection is based on
competition. How can natural selection lead to cooperation among selfish in-
dividuals? Fortunately, together with classic game theory, evolutionary game
theory provides a systematic framework for investigating the emergence and
maintenance of cooperative behavior among unrelated and selfish individuals.
Two simple games, namely, Prisoner’s Dilemma game (PDG) and Snowdrift
game (SG), as metaphors for studying the evolution of cooperation have been
extensively adopted by researchers from different background [2,3,4,5,6,7]. In
the original PDG, two players simultaneously decide whether to cooperate (C)
or to defect (D). They both receive R upon mutual cooperation and P upon
mutual defection. A defector exploiting a C player gets T , and the exploited
cooperator receives S, such that T > R > P > S. As a result, it is best to
defect regardless of the co-player’s decision. Thus, in well-mixed infinite pop-
ulations, defection is the evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) [8], even though
all individuals would be better off if they cooperated. Thereby this creates the
social dilemma, because when everybody defects, the mean population payoff
is lower than that when everybody cooperates. Whereas in the SG, the order
of P and S is exchanged, such that T > R > S > P . Its essential ingredient is
that in contrast to the PDG, cooperation has an advantage when rare, which
implies that the replicator dynamics of the SG converges to a mixed stable
equilibrium where both C and D strategies are present [8]. It is important to
note that in this state the population payoff is smaller than it would be if ev-
eryone played C, hence the SG still represents a social dilemma [9]. In addition,
the SG is of much applications and interests within biological context. In order
to solve these social dilemmas, a variety of suitable extensions on these basic
models has been investigated [3,5,6,7]. Most importantly, it is found that coop-
eration can be promoted and sustained in the network-structured population
substantially [6,10,11]. Indeed, the successful development of network science
provides a convenient framework for describing the dynamical interactions of
games. The evolution of cooperation on model networks with features such
as lattices [12,13,14,15], small-world [17,16,18], scale-free [6], and community
structure [19] has been scrutinized. Moreover, the understanding of the ef-
fect of network structure on the evolution of cooperation reaches to consensus
gradually: the heterogeneity of the network of contacts plays a significant role
in the emergence of cooperation. However, the puzzle of cooperation is unan-
swered yet. What on earth conditions the emergence of cooperation is still a
challenging problem [20,21]. Most noteworthy, Nowak summarized five possi-
ble rules for the evolution of cooperation corresponding to different situations
(see Ref. [22] and references therein). Nevertheless, to our best knowledge,
these results are mostly based upon simplified scenario and model. To inspect
the evolution of cooperation, further details and characteristics of real world
should be considered and integrated.
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The World Wide Web (WWW) in its first decade was like a big online library,
where people mainly searched for information. Today, owing to new social
technologies, the web is undergoing a subtle but profound shift, dubbed Web
2.0, to become more of a social web, not unlike the WWW inventor Tim
Berners-Lee’s original vision. The use of collaborative technologies such as
blogs and wikis also leads to change of the ways of people’s thinking and
communicating. People, especially college students, take advantage of online
social network services for messaging, sharing information, and keeping in
touch with each other. This creates an emerging online community which
is largely being shaped by dynamic interactions between users in real time.
Therefore, these services provide an extraordinary online laboratory to study
dynamic pattern of social interactions conveniently and effectively. In what
follows, the two aforementioned metaphors—PDG and SG in an empirical
social network will be examined.
In this paper, we present our observations into a Chinese social networking
site open to college students (the social networking site Xiaonei, which began
in late 2005 in select universities, but grew quickly to encompass a very large
number of universities.). We empirically study the evolution of cooperation
on such online social network which retains the essential of real-world social
interactions. In particular, it is suggested that the evolution of cooperation on
empirical social networks is influenced by a variey of network effects, includ-
ing heterogeneity, small-world effect, local highly-connected clusters, average
connectivity, etc. In the rest of this paper, first, we will analyze the structure
of the online social network, then investigate the two social dilemmas (PDG
and SG) on this social network by the method analogous to replicator dy-
namics, observing the time evolution of cooperation. After that, we discuss
the simulation results and make explanations. Finally, we draw the conclusion
remarks.
2 The structure of the online social network
The actual relational data was obtained from a Chinese social networking
site open to college students. We focus on the connected component, which is
composed of 396, 836 nodes and 3, 548, 572 bidirectional edges (we viewed this
network as undirected one). We perform statistical analysis of the structure
of this social network. The quantities such as degree distribution, clustering
coefficient, average shortest path length, etc are calculated to capture the fea-
tures of the online social network. In Fig. 1, we report the degree distribution
P (k), which gives the probability that randomly selected node has exactly
k edges. Clearly, we can see that P (k) follows two different scalings with k,
depending on the specified critical degree value kc. P (k) obeys a power-law
form ∼ k−γ1 with γ1 = 0.72±0.01 when k < kc = 30. Otherwise, P (k) ∼ k
−γ2 ,
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Fig. 1. The degree distribution P (k) of the online social network. The dot line
indicates the critical degree kc = 30: for k < kc, P (k) follows a power-law as
∼ k−0.72, while for k > kc, P (k) obeys a power-law as ∼ k
−2.12. The slopes of the
left and right straight lines are respectively −0.72 and −2.12 for comparison with
the degree distribution.
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Fig. 2. The plot of degree-dependent clustering coefficient C(k) vs. degree k. A clear
power-law is absent, but C(k)’s dependence on k is nontrivial. The dot line has slope
−1.
where γ2 = 2.12 ± 0.02 for k > kc. The degree distribution above the critical
degree kc is consistent with past findings of social networks with the degree
exponent 2 < γ < 3 [23]. Whereas, for small degree k below kc, the scaling
exponent of P (k) is less than two. Considerable fraction of nodes have only
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Table 1
Percentage of nodes with 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 degrees. Note that a large fraction of
nodes have only small degrees.
k= 1 2 3 4 5
11.6% 6.2% 4.6% 3.7% 3.3%
low connectivity (see Tab. 1). About 68% nodes’ degrees are not more than
30. The average degree 〈k〉 is 17.9.
The length of average shortest path 〈l〉 is calculated, which is the mean of
geodesic distance between any pairs that have at least a path connecting them.
In this case, 〈l〉 = 3.72. And the diameter D of this social networks which is
defined as the maximum of the shortest path length, is 12. The clustering
coefficient of node i is defined as Ci =
2Ei
ki(ki−1)
, that is the ratio between the
number Ei of edges that actually exit between these ki neighbor nodes of node
i and the total number ki(ki − 1)/2. The clustering coefficient of the whole
network is the average of all individual Ci’s. We find the clustering coefficient
C = 0.27, order of magnitude much higher than that of a corresponding ran-
dom graph of the same size Crand = 17.9/396836 = 4.51 × 10
−5. Besides, the
degree-dependent local clustering coefficient C(k) is averaging Ci over vertices
of degree k. Fig. 2 plots the distribution of C(k) vs. k. For clarity, we add the
dot line with slope −1 in the log-log scale. However, it is hard to declare a
clear power law in our case. Nevertheless, the nonflat clustering coefficient
distributions shown in the figure suggests that the dependency of C(k) on k
is nontrivial, and thus points to some degree of hierarchy in the networks. In
many networks, the average clustering coefficient C(k) exhibits a highly non-
trivial behavior with a power-law decay as a function of k [24], indicating that
low-degree nodes generally belong to well-interconnected communities (corre-
sponding to high clustering coefficient of the low-connectivity nodes), while
high-degree sites are linked to many nodes that may belong to different groups
(resulting in small clustering coefficient of the large-degree nodes). This is gen-
erally the feature of a nontrivial architecture in which small-degree vertices
are well-clustered around the hubs (high degree vertices), and organized in a
hierarchical manner into increasingly large groups. Thus, our empirical social
network has such fundamental characteristic of hierarchy.
Another important element characterizing the local organization of complex
networks is the degree correlation of node i and its neighbor. Following New-
man [25], assortativity coefficient r is measured by the Pearson correlation
coefficient of the degrees at either ends of an edge, which can be written as
r =
M−1
∑
i jiki − [M
−1∑
i
1
2
(ji + ki)]
2
M−1
∑
i
1
2
(j2i + k
2
i )− [M
−1
∑
i
1
2
(ji + ki)]2
, (1)
where ji, ki are the degrees of the vertices at the ends of the ith edge, with
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i = 1, · · · ,M (M is the total number of edges in the observed graph or net-
work). We calculate the degree assortativity coefficient (or degree-degree cor-
relation) r of the online social network. In our case, r = −0.0036, which means
the social network shows “disassortative mixing” on its degrees. Networks with
assortative mixing pattern are those in which nodes with large degree tend to
be connected to other nodes with many connections and vice visa. Technical
and biological networks are in general disassortative, while social networks are
often assortatively mixed as demonstrated by the study on scientific collab-
oration networks [25]. Internet dating community, a kind of social networks
embedded in a technical one, and peer to peer (P2P) social networks are sim-
ilar to our case, displaying a significant disassortative mixing pattern [26,27].
Herein, we have presented the structural analysis of our online social network.
The observed network has small-world property, that is, high clustering coeffi-
cient and short average shortest path length. Moreover, it is an inhomogeneous
one, namely, the tail of degree distribution obeys a power law. Additionally, it
has nontrivial hierarchical organizations—low-degree nodes generally belong
to well-interconnected clusters, while high-degree vertices are linked to many
nodes that may belong to different groups. Besides, it exhibits disassortative
mixing pattern. In the successive section, we will investigate the evolution of
cooperation in the social network, revealing the cooperation level is affected
by the topological organizations of the social network.
3 Social dilemmas on the social network
We consider the evolutionary PDG and SG on the sampled social network
(composed of 9, 677 nodes) which is a good representative of the original large-
scale one. Each vertex represents an individual and the edges denote links
between players in terms of game dynamical interaction. The individuals are
pure strategists, following two simple strategies: cooperate (C) and defect (D).
The spatial distribution of strategies is described by a two-dimensional unit
vector for each player x, namely,
s =


1
0

 and


0
1

 , (2)
for cooperators and defectors, respectively. Each individual plays the PDG/SG
with its immediate “neighbors” defined by their who-meets-whom relation-
ships and the incomes are accumulated. The total income of the player at the
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site x can be expressed as
Px =
∑
y∈Ωx
sTxMsy, (3)
where the Ωx denotes the neighboring sites of x, and the sum runs over neigh-
bor set Ωx of the site x. Following common practice [3,9,12,28], the payoff
matrices have rescaled forms for PDG and SG respectively,
M =


1 0
b 0

 and


1 1− r
1 + r 0

 , (4)
where 1 < b < 2 and 0 < r < 1.
In evolutionary games the players are allowed to adopt the strategies of their
neighbors after each round. Then, the individual x randomly selects a neighbor
y for possibly updating its strategy. The site x will adopt y’s strategy with
probability determined by the total payoff difference between them [12]:
Wsx←sy =
1
1 + exp[(Px − Py)/T ]
, (5)
where the parameter T characterizes the noise effects, including fluctuations
in payoffs, errors in decision, individual trials, etc. T = 0 denotes the complete
rationality, in which the individual always adopts the better strategy deter-
minately. Whereas T →∞ denotes the complete randomness of decision. For
finite value of T , it introduces bounded rationality to individual’s decision
making.
In what follows, we present our investigations to the two social dilemmas
played by individuals occupying the vertices of the sampled social network.
The evolution of the frequency of cooperators as a function of the parame-
ter b for PDG and r for SG is obtained. Besides, we also observe the time
evolution of cooperators under different values of b (r). Initially, an equal
percentage of cooperators and defectors is randomly distributed among the
elements of the population. Here, we adopt the synchronous updating rule.
Each individual will adapt its strategy according to Eq. (5) after each round
game. Equilibrium frequencies of cooperators are obtained by averaging over
1000 generations after a transient time of 20000 generations. Each data point
results from averaging over 100 runs. In the following simulations, T = 0.02
is kept invariant [29].
In Fig. 3, we report the frequency of cooperators fc as a function of temptation
to defect b in PDG. It is clear that fc nontrivially decreases with increasing
7
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Fig. 3. Frequency of cooperators as a function of temptation to defect b in PDG.
b. Note that the cooperation level fc is not as remarkable as that in model
scale-free network [Baraba´si-Albert (BA)], especially for small b. Nonetheless,
the cooperators can survive for the entire range of b (1 < b < 2), avoiding
dying out, when confronted with the intense invasion of advantaged defectors.
Replicator dynamics in well-mixed population points out defection is the only
evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) in PDG. Hence cooperators will be wiped
out by natural selection in well-mixed populations. In fact, interactions in real-
world are heterogeneous, in the sense that different individuals have different
numbers of average neighbors with whom they interact with, a feature associ-
ated with a power-law dependence of the degree distribution. Previous study
on model BA scale-free network, which captures the real-world heterogeneity,
found that scale-free networks provide a unifying framework for emergence
of cooperation [6,10,11]. Here, our empirical study also provides a convincing
evidence that degree heterogeneity is one of the factors promoting cooperation
in realistic social networks. It is shown the time evolution of cooperation in
PDG corresponding to different values of b in Fig. 4. For small b near one,
starting from 50% cooperators, cooperators dominate the populations. When
b increases, the frequency of cooperation is diminished in a manner that coop-
eration level drop rapidly down at first, after generations and generations, the
frequency of cooperation struggles to recover to a higher level (see Panels (b)
and (c) in Fig. 4). For large b near two, although defectors prevail in the net-
worked populations, cooperators still can survive in such tough environment
(about 10% on average).
In parallel, the evolution of cooperation as a function of cost-to-benefit ratio
r of mutual cooperation for SG is presented in Fig. 5. In well-mixed scenario,
replicator dynamics of the SG converges to an equilibrium frequency for co-
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Fig. 4. The evolution of cooperation corresponding to different values of b in PDG.
(a) b = 1.05, (b) b = 1.35, (c) b = 1.6, (d) b = 1.9.
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Fig. 5. Frequency of cooperators as a function of cost-to-benefit ratio r of mutual
cooperation in SG.
operators given by 1 − r, corresponding to the red straight line as shown in
Fig. 5. Except for small value r near zero, the cooperation level on our em-
pirical social network is higher than that in the well-mixed situation. Thus
cooperation is enhanced in our case. Generally speaking, because our social
network incorporates various features, including heterogeneity, of which effects
to cooperation are additive, the cooperation level is not promoted as much as
in model BA scale-free networks where the cooperation level is mainly affected
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Fig. 6. The evolution of cooperation corresponding to different values of r in SG.
(a) r = 0.05, (b) r = 0.3, (c) r = 0.5, (d) r = 0.9.
by heterogeneity. And also, we investigated the time evolution of cooperation
for SG, as displayed in Fig. 6. For small value of r, the population frequently
evolves into an absorbing state of full cooperators when starting from an equal
percentage of cooperators and defectors [see Fig. 6(a) and (b)]. As r → 1, the
frequency of cooperators decreases from 50% quickly, and oscillates around
the dynamic equilibrium state.
Moreover, fraction of runs which ended with full cooperators vs. b for PDG
and r for SG is shown in Fig. 7. For each value of b and r, we ran 100 indepen-
dent simulations, starting from 50% cooperators. We found that, for b < 1.4 in
PDG and r < 0.5 in SG, the networked population evolves into absorbing state
of full cooperators with a probability around 50%. In this situation, except for
some individual runs ending up with full cooperators, others ended up with
low frequency of cooperation on occasion as a result of the different initial
distributions of cooperators and defectors among the population. However,
when b > 1.4 for PDG and r > 0.5 for SG, most of the runs ended up with
massive defectors which resulted in the low frequency of cooperation. Accord-
ingly, even though the network structure promotes cooperation, its positive
influence to the evolution of cooperation is to some extent suppressed by the
increasing parameters b and r.
On the other hand, together with heterogeneity, other factors including av-
erage connectivity [30], small-world effect [17], degree-degree correlation [31],
randomness in topology [32], etc, play crucial roles in the evolution of co-
operation. Rather than investigations on model networks where only one or
few features of real-world relationships are present, the evolution of cooper-
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Fig. 7. Fraction of runs which ended with full cooperators vs. b (r) for PDG (SG).
For each value of b (r), we ran 100 simulations, starting from 50% cooperators.
ation on the empirical social networks, which possess a variety of features
in topological organizations, should be understood from a synthesis view. In
our case, besides the scale-free feature, the online social network has small-
world property, hierarchical organizations and disassortative mixing pattern.
Concerning small-world property of the underlying network, the short average
distance promotes the propagation process of cooperators. Furthermore, tak-
ing account for the hierarchical organizations [due to C(k)’s dependence on
k], i.e., local well-clustered low-degree nodes, such common cluster structure
induces the clustering of cooperators, leading to the surviving and enhance-
ment of cooperation [9]. The mixing pattern also influences the cooperation
level substantially. It is thought that the cooperation level is optimum in
uncorrelated networks (where the assortativity coefficient is zero) [31]. Our
sampled network is a disassortative one (assortativity coefficient is −0.0007),
thus the frequency of cooperators is diminished in a way by such mixing pat-
tern. Finally, as pointed out in Ref. [30], maximum cooperation level occurs
at intermediate average degree, in our case, the average connectivity of the
sampled network is about 10. To a certain extent, this quantity of average
connectivity affects the evolution of cooperation. Consequently, the evolution
of cooperation on the empirical network is simultaneously affected by these
additive factors as the underlying network possesses various characteristics of
real-world social interactions. Actually, the combined network effects of these
factors facilitate and maintain the cooperation among selfish individuals. Our
results may shed light on the evolution of cooperation in social and economical
systems.
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4 Concluding remarks
In conclusion, we have studied two social dilemmas—PDG and SG in an on-
line social network. We demonstrated that the social network has small-world
property and is scale-free in degree distribution. In addition, it was shown that
the underlying network has hierarchical organizations in which low-degree ver-
tices are well-connected in different communities, while large-degree nodes are
linked to many nodes that may belong to different groups. We also found that
the social network shows disassortative mixing pattern. Then we investigated
the evolution of cooperation on such empirical social network, observing the
time evolution of frequency of cooperators for evolutionary PDG and SG re-
spectively. The underlying network structure leads to the enhancement and
maintenance of cooperation in unrelated and selfish individuals. Besides, with
not too large b < 1.4 for PDG and r < 0.5 for SG, the networked population
evolves into the absorbing state of full cooperators at a probability around
half one. Otherwise, most of the runs ended up with massive defectors. Differ-
ent from games on model networks, understanding the evolution of coopera-
tion on empirical network should be conducted from a synthesis view because
real-world relational networks incorporate various characteristics while model
networks generally focus on some specified features. Thus, we conclude that
the evolution of cooperation on the empirical network is jointly affected by
additive network effects, including average connectivity, small-world property,
degree heterogeneity (scale-free), degree-degree correlation, hierarchical orga-
nizations, etc. Our results may help understand the cooperative behaviors in
human societies.
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